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Abstract 
Sustainability  constraints  are  quickly  catching  up  with  economic  developments  in  water 
catchment  areas.  Inefficient  water  use  by households,  primary  producers  and  industrial 
sectors may account for a  large  proportion of depleted water in  most African  river basins. 
Existing integrated water allocation  tools  are seldom comprehensive enough to  account for 
all possible  uses  of water in  a  river basin.  This  paper attempts  to  model water resource 
allocation  in  a  river basin  by specifically posing  sustainability constraints  in  an  integrated 
model.  The  results show that in  "open  access" property regimes,  resource users are myopic 
and  could  deplete  water  and  vegetal  cover.  In  a  "common  property" regime  however, 
individuals are less callous and would be willing to  pay a premium,  ex-ante and ex-post,  for 
the maintenance of the resource in  a manner that maximizes private and collective welfare. 
In  particular,  when  all resource  users face  some ecological restrictions on  the  use  of water 
and complementary resources,  sustainability could be achieved without reducing the flow of 
private and social benefits to all resource users collectively. 
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Sustainability  constraints  are  quickly  catching  up  with  economic  developments  in  water 
catchment areas. Inefficient water use by households, primary producers and industrial sectors 
may account for a large  proportion of depleted  water in  most African  river basins.  Resource 
managers  often  bear  the  resultant  blunt  of criticism,  which  is  reasonable  considering  the 
enormous  institutional  failures  to acknowledge  multiple  uses  of water and  at  the  same  time 
manage conflicts among users. 
Contemporary  resource  management regimes  represent  a  movement away from  centralized 
decision making to a form of participatory approaches that seek the inputs of all agents that will 
be  affected  by  the  policy.  The  rationale  for  inclusion  rather  than  exclusion  of the  public  in 
decision-making  is  that there  are  a variety of actors directly or indirectly affected  by resource 
development.  The  actors  exert  influence  on  the  resource  and  on  others  depending  on  their 
ecological  importance,  power (e.g.  extent of their operations,  market power,  negotiation skills, 
customary rights,  statutory authority, etc), their objective (value) functions, and the level of,  and 
the system of cooperation among the actors. 
When resource managers fail to understand the system even in its simplest and uncooperative 
form,  imposition  of  a  policy  will  have  ex-post  results  that  could  significantly  divert  from 
sustainability  paths.  Inclusion  on  the  other  hand,  allows  the  interaction  among  actors  to 
1 
H031521. \\\"'ue\\<;Je  ?'V\\<;J'j  ex-ante, em\)  \ea'le \'ne ex-pos\ assessmen\ 0' \'ne  enec;'(weness 01  poliCY  'to 
focus on  improving the foundation of the policy, which is rooted in the structure of cooperation 
among actors. 
t:.l\.ltiU\\Q. lnteg.,ate<1 \Nate, a\\Q<:.at\QI:\. \QQ\",  ~~~  ~\~<:;:;<:.<;\ '\:.<:)<:.<;\):l\~\;\~\\~\"l~ 'C\\'Vu'9n \'V a<;J<;J'VU\\\ 1m  all 
possible  uses of water in a river basin. In  most cases only  a subset of users, predominantly 
irrigators, nousenolds, and  pastoralists are  given  prominence  understandably because they 
exhibit intense and at times volatile competition for water. Exclusion of other users, especially 
embedded species in  the ecosystem, is less acknowledged than the empirical usefulness of 
the decision models themselves. 
While economic analyses are the easiest way of conceptualising resource allocation, a lot can 
be  gained  from  broadening  the  scope  to  include  institutional  and  ecological  dynamics. 
Economic  analyses  emphasize  on  measuring  efficiency  of water  (utilization)  as  the  benefit 
realised from an activity as a function of the amount of water used directly by the activity. The 
Paretian  concept  of  efficiency  in  allocation  requires  that  water  be  allocated  to  the  highest 
bidder, or the one whose output per unit of water used is the highest. Unfortunately, efficiency 
does  not  guarantee  equity  and  sustainability  in  resource  allocation.  Sustainability 
considerations require a prototype model formulated along the lines of the Walrasian  General 
Equilibrium model combining the value functions of all  the agents in  the riVer basin, including 
the resource requirements of the ecologically embedded agents 
1
• 
This  paper attempts to model water resource allocation in  a river basin by specifically posing 
sustainability  constraints  in  an  integrated  model
2
.  The  primary  hypothesis  that  is  tested 
analytically is whether the water resource will be depleted in the absence of sustainability rules. 
The  secondary  hypothesis  is  whether individual  agents  may  find  it  in  their best  interest  to 
cooperate  and  share  some  costs in  maintaining the  resource.  Last but not least,  the  paper 
attempts to predict the time path of the  resource assuming different initial  scenarios, different 
strategies by the actors and a variety of policy directions. 
The model 
A river basin  is  a natural unit for integrated water resources planning and  management, since 
water interacts with and to a large degree controls the extent of other natural components such 
as  soil,  vegetation,  and  wildlife (Cai,  et aI.,  2003). Water supplies  in  a catchment area come 
from  surface sources (including the  rivers,  streams,  and  marshes),  and  from  ground  sources 
(aquifers).  Generally,  water  is  considered  a  renewable  resource,  although  some  sources, 
especially aquifers could  be  depleted.  However,  if the  rate of groundwater extraction  is  less 
than or equal to the rate of recharge, water use from  an aquifer could be sustained indefinitely 
(Conrad,1999). 
Economic models could help in the decision-making processes dealing with complex systems. 
Important  economic  issues  in  integrated  economic-hydrologic  river  basin  modeling  include 
transaction costs, agricultural productivity effects of allocation mechanisms, intersectoral water 
allocation,  environmental  impacts  of  allocations,  and  property  rights  in  water  for  different 
allocation  mechanisms.  Some  of these  models attempt to determine the  optimal spatial  and 
temporal  allocation  of  a  complex  water  resource  system  and  to  examine  the  relative 
performance of various policies (Rose grant, et aI., 1996; Cai, et aI., 2003). 
1  For  exposition  purposes,  the  terms  "catchment  area"  and  "river  basin"  are  used  interchangeably 
although a catchment area is more encompassing and extensive and may consist several river basins. 4 
2  The Brundtland Commission defined Sustainable Development as "development that meets the needs of 
the  present generation  without  compromising  the  ability of future  generations  to  meet their own" (The 
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED),  1987). 
2 In most communities, surface and groundwater are an open access resource with no exclusive 

property  assigned  to  specific  individuals.  If  however  the  community  elects  to  collectively 

manage the resource, the water becomes a common property for which each voting member of 

the  community  is  responsible,  both  for  use  and  maintenance.  Integrated  catchment 

management  models  assume  either an  open  access  or a  common  property  and  simulate 

interactions  among  the  water  users  on  one  hand,  and  between  the  government  or public 





In  this  study,  the  water from  the  various  surface  and  ground  sources  are  a  vital  part of a 

resource  ecosystem.  The  ecosystem  consists  of  commercial  farmers  (mainly  irrigators), 

smallholder  farmers,  household  users,  pastoralists,  public  agencies,  and  animal  and  plant 

species embedded in the system
3
• The model will primarily describe the resource base in terms 

of the  quantity of water in  the  catcrment area.  The primary control  variable  is  therefore  the 

amount of water extracted per unit of activity in  each sector. Other riparian resources are of a 







Commercial farmers are interested in  land and water for productive use. They produce crops 

for  local  consumption  and  for trade.  They control  the  use  of the  water resource  by  having 

licensed activities, and by having permanent tenure for their landholdings. Commercial farmers 





I]j(L,K,S,W)  P(q)q-Cj(L,K,S,W)  ... (1) 

Where  I] is  farmeri's profit,  expressed as a function  of market price  P(q) for her produce, q 

and costs,  Ci  which are also a function of labour (L), capital (K), land (S) and water (W). 

Households and smallholder farmers 

Smallholder farmers are also interested in productive use of water and land. Unlike commercial 

farmers,  most of the crops produced by smallholder farmers are grown on  untenable land and 

are  mainly used  for subsistence  consumption.  In  terms of commercial  interests,  smallholder 

farmers are usually not fully integrated in the inputs and produce markets and so their assumed 

market behaviour is  similar to those of subsistence  households.  It therefore  becomes almost 

impossible to separate the interests of smallholder farmers from  household water users since 

they have almost similar characteristics. 

Household water users are  more concerned with  amenities that water provides for household 

production  functions such as cooking, washing, bathing, and drinking.  Households also value 

the  harvest  of  fish,  weeds,  reeds,  and  other  materials  along  watercourses  or  marshes. 

Together, households and smallholder farmers are a formidable resource extracting 'union' that 

may threaten the existence of commercial resource users. 

Households (and smallholder farmers) are assumed to maximize a utility function, which takes 

as its arguments, the subsistence production, leisure, and amenities from water. 

... (2) 
3  The description of stakeholders in a river basin is consistent with characteristics observed in  the Malawi 
formal  water catchment  management  areas.  Similar patterns  could  be  observed  in  the  SAOC  region, 
especially in Mozambique,  Tanzania,  Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
3 
.. 
Where  U  j  is  household j  's  utility  as  a  function  of subsistence  level  of consumption,  I,  the 
maximum available time for leisure  and  labour,  T,  and W is the  household's consumption of 
water.  For  internal  consistency  a  household  is  assumed  to  have  maximum  subsistence 
L
max consumption, ["laX  and  a  limit,  on  the  capacity  to  supply  labour  input.  Consequently 
household excess production (or income) and leisure hours are respectively defined as below. 
I max 1  _ 
j  j  ... (3) 
L
max T 
j  j  ... (4) 
Pastoralists and nomadic grazers 
Pastoralists are interested  in  water and patches of vegetation along  river banks, and natural 
vegetation  and  forests  elsewhere  in  the  catchment  area.  They  produce  animal  and  diary 
products for local  consumption  and for trade.  They are typically nomadic,  moving  over large 
areas and sometimes, encroaching and trampling over land, which belongs to  formal interests. 
Pastoralists claim customary rights over water and pasture, and the rights are usually passed 
on from generation to generation. 
Grazing pressure may lead to discontinuous and sometimes irreversible change in  the state of 
the  grassland.  The degradation  of the  grassland  is  marked  by  changes  in  the  density and 
distribution  of shrubs and  perennial  grasses,  as well  as in  the  patchiness of the  landscape 
(Perrings, et aI.,  1997). The main concern  for pastorafists then is to  maximize productivity of 
their herd,  subject to the  evolution  of vegetation  and water.  Formally,  they  maximize  profits 
from livestock subject to the availability of palatable grasses and water  . 
... (5) 
Subject to herd and resource dynamics 

x/+1 =  XI + f(XI,VI,WI )- hi  ... (6) 

Vt+l  VI  +g(XI,VI,WI)  ... (7) 
Wt+1  =WI  + r(xl , VI' WI' 8)  ... (8) 
Where at time t,  NPB  is the net benefit to a pastoralist from animal and diary products,  X,  is 
t 
the biomass or population of the herd,  h,  is the product (meat, diary, hldes, etc) from the herd, 
v,  is the biomass of vegetal cover,  W,  is  the  amount of water in  the catchment area,  £,  are 
weather parameters, while f,  g and r are functions. 
The public sector 
The  government  or  public  agencies  are  included  as  external  stakeholders  who  may  take 
responsibility  for  the  conservation/preservation  of  water  resources  by  ensuring  equitable 
distribution of water, and taking on the role of conflict arbitration. Conflicts may arise between a 
commercial farmer and a pastoralist over the latter's indiscretion in moving their animals over 
land and water and the commercial farmer's property rights over land and water.  Households 
and  commercial  interests  may argue  over access and  distribution  of land  and water,  while 
pastoralists may find favour from households as long as animals are kept away from sources of 
drinking water. 
4 Given the complexity of incentives of the agents using the water resource, the government has 
three  alternative  interventions.  The first  alternative is to  do  nothing and  let agents  maximize 
their  own  private  benefits without worrying  about the  effects that their actions  may have on 
other  users.  This  is  the  case  of  "laissez-faire,  open  access"  resource.  Alternatively,  the 
government may wish to impose rules by directly dictating the behaviour of all the agents using 
the resource. This second case is typical  of a "command economy" where the  government is 
not only a producer of public goods and services,  but also the owner of means of production, 
and sole distributor of resources.  Lastly, the  government may allow some cooperation among 
users as they agree on  how best to collectively manage the water and the natural resources in 
the catchment area. The latter case is that of "common property" resource. 
The  next  section  considers  "open  access"  and  "common  property"  regimes  in  detail.  A 
"refutable" assumption is that agents maintain their objective functions in both scenarios. 
Analytical Results 
Assuming a laissez-faire open access scenario, agents maximize short run  benefits since they 
do  not concern themselves with the effects that their actions may have on  others.  This is  in 
contrast with  situations where agents must account for externalities by internalizing both costs 
and  benefits from  a series of feedback impacts from their activities. Since feedback effects do 
not enter the  decision  functions of the  agents,  static optima  sufficiently describe equilibrium 
conditions in "open access" allocation problems. The static equilibrium for each agent is found 
by maximizing the relevant objective function subject to its corresponding constraints. 
Static optimum in open access 
Commercial farmers 
Commercial farmers  maximize profits by selecting inputs at the  point where the real  marginal 
contribution of the input to output is exactly offset by the real cost of the input. 
877 =877  81]  877  = 0  ... (9)
8L  8K  8S  8W 
Where, L, K, Sand Ware as defined above. 
Thus it would  not be worthwhile for farmers to employ an  input whose real  addition to revenue 
is less than  what it costs to  retain  the input. As shown in Appendix 1 (Equations A 1.1- A 1.4), 
this implies that farmers employ inputs only when  the  value  marginal  product of the input is 
greater or equal to the marginal cost of the input. Further, the first order conditions imply that, 
for commercial farmers, it is optimal to use the  largest amount of water up to the point where 
the  marginal  benefit  of water  is  zero.  This  is  especially  true  when  the  costs  of irrigation 
equipment and  operations  are  internalized  but not charged  to  the amount of water pumped 
from  aquifers  or  rivers.  Thus,  for  water  resources,  which  are  freely  available,  the  optimal 
solution is to use as much water as is  possible to drive the value marginal product of water to 
zero.  As  a  consequence,  water from  aquifers  and  rivers  is  used  inefficiently  and  could  be 
depleted. 
Households and smallholder farmers 
Smallholder farmers  maximize utility from  subsistence consumption (of water and  agricultural 
output)  and  from  leisure  where,  assuming  a  quasi-linear  technology  with  non-negativity 
constraints (i.e, I  > 0,  T  > 0,  and W  > 0) : 
... (10) 
5 Where I,  T,  Land Ware as defined above, and  li = 0, ..., 5 are parameters. 
Substituting terms from definitions (3) and (4) above, the  relevant total differential is as derived 
below. 
...  (11) 

Utility  is  maximized  when  the  shadow  wage  rate  from  the  uncompensated  time  spent 
producing excess food is equal to the shadow price of time spent collecting water (Appendix 1, 
A  1.5-A  1.10). Although water is available for free in the rivers and aquifers, it has an opportunity 
cost equal to the  time  value of labor in  the  production ofAxcess food,  which could  be  sold  or 
reserved  for future  subsistence  consumption.  Similarly leisure  has an  opportunity cost which 
could be measured in terms of forgone subsistence output. 
Pastoralists 
Pastoralists employ labor and  procure  basic services for maintaining a given  herd.  They also 
face costs of time spent searching suitable pasture and water for their animals. Assuming labor 
and  procurements are  a fixed  proportion of the  herd  population, the pastoralists maximize the 
net private benefits by choosing a stock level and inadvertently, the level of water in  the rivers 
and aquifers, and the form of vegetation cover. 
8NPB  _ 8NPB _ 8NPB _ ° 
~-------- ... (12) 
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These conditions,  derived  fully  in  Appendix  1 imply that pastoralists would  be  maximizing net 
benefits  by equating the value  marginal private  benefits from  animal  products (offtake)  to  the 
cost of maintaining an  additional unit of herd. The marginal net private benefits and the cost of 
the herd change with respect to changes in the vegetal cover around the river basin, in addition 
to  the  level  of water.  In  particular,  pastoralists  maximize  private  benefits  by  equating  the 
change  in  the  value  of  offtake  due  to  a  change  in  either  vegetation  or  water  to  the 
corresponding marginal cost of water or vegetation. Just like commercial farmers,  pastoralists 
face zero marginal cost of both river water and vegetation. The static solution therefore implies 
that  pastoralists  could  use  water and  vegetation  up  to  the  point where  the  marginal  private 
benefit from offtake is also zero. 
Apart from the obvious threat to the sustain ability of water and vegetal resources, the nomadic 
activities of pastoralists pose  external  costs to the environment and  on  other resource  users. 
The externalities are usually a crucible for conflicts with other resource users. Unfortunately the 
absence  of a  regulator  in  "open  access"  resources  suggests  that  conflicts  could  escalate 
unless  intermediations  were  installed.  Soil  degradation  is  rapid  in  areas  frequented  by 
trampling  animals.  The  change  in  vegetal  cover  is  often  the  first  noticeable  environmental 
damage but it may take a while  before the  change in vegetal  cover has any impact on  water 
cycle and on low flow in the rivers. 
Dynamic solution 
A cooperative game with decentralized regulation 
Water is  the main resource of concern for all agents, while as shown above, vegetation cover 
directly affects the value  of offtake and  indirectly the  level of water in  the  catchment and  the 
quality of soils  in  the  arable  lands.  The  idea  is  that  by cooperating  in  the  use  of water and 
vegetation, all agents would  be able to  maximize their private benefits but only if other agents' 
objective functions attain minimum acceptable values.  Hence,  within  a voting  community with 
universal suffrage, the individuals' objective function is constrained by values chosen by fellow 
voters, so that where individuals contribute to the maintenance of the public goods, individuals 
6 
- ..~-.~-~ would  care  about the  magnitude of their own  contributions only insofar as these contributions 
affect the aggregate level of benefits (Bemheim, 1986). 
Assuming that a cooperating structure is agreed upon  by all the agents in  the catchment area, 
i.e.,  commercial  farmers,  smallholder  farmers,  households  and  pastoralists  set  cooperating 
parameters  in  the  use  of water and  vegetation,  then  an  inter-temporal  value  function  is  the 
relevant allocation tool.  In  such a cooperative model, the agents playa series of games from 
which  weights  are  assigned to their benefits so as to  maximize their combined  benefits from 
water and vegetation. 
A decentralized public authority may control  the way in  which the  cooperative game is  played 
by either actively playing the  role  of guardian for the  ecosystem in  general, or maintaining an 
environment for fair play among the agents. The  decentralized regulator therefore  maximizes 
the  aggregate  benefits  from  the  activities  of all  the  agents  subject  to  the  dynamics  of the 
affected resources. For this particular system the problem is specified below. 
JWaxilnize 
~  00 
LP/  {rl1J/Lt'KI'St'~) + r2UI(lI'I;,~)  +r3 NPB/}= Lplev(.) ..  (13) 
Subject to equations 6,  7 and 8 

Where7]f(')'  U/(.),  and  NPB
1  are  as  defined  above,  pi is  the  discount  factor  at  time  t, 

y"i  1,2,3are weights, and  (t  = 0)  is the current period. 

The  aggregate  benefits are  cast  in  a discrete form  in  order to  capture  seasonal  changes  in 
water  level  and  vegetal  cover.  The  Lagrangean  for  the  cooperative  model  is  specified  as 
follows. 
L  Ipl{eV(.) +PA1 +1[XI +I(x!,  vI' WI) - hi  xH  ]+ pBl+l [VI + g(xl' vI' WI) - Vl+l]+ 
1=0 
... (14) 
The maximum principles for this problem are derived in Appendix 2. 
Implications ofthe maximum principles 
Equation A.2,4 says that the marginal benefit from any future additions to the animal stock of 
the  pastoralists should equal the weighted marginal benefit from offtake in  the current period, 
plus the future benefit from maintaining the current stock and any small additions to it, plus the 
future  cost that the  herd  would  impose  on  the  environment as  measured  by  the  change  in 
vegetation and water level. The obvious implication  from A.2,4 is  that if the vegetation or the 
water level falls as a result of the increase in stock level, the future net benefit from offtake falls 
by the corresponding shadow value of the exhausted resource.  There could also be benefits if 
it  were  possible  to  control  the  availability  of water  or  the  rate  of growth  of vegetation  by 
changing the herd stocking level. 
There are other externalities associated with grazing practices especially of nomadic livestock. 
These include the imposed cost on farmers who own less or no animals. Soil compaction due 
to perennial trampling necessitates frequent tilling of irrigation land for water to infiltrate during 
the growing season. When the first rains come, a significant amount of fertile soil is lost through 
erosion  since the  frequent tilling  leaves the topsoil  unstable. Soil  maintenance costs (to regain 
7 fertility and  structure) are  therefore  not negligible. Although the  nutrient requirements of grass 
in  the  grazing  lands is  lower compared  to  that of crops,  the  destruction  to  the  soil  structure 
could  leave  the  grazing  land  less  productive  in  terms  of consumable  vegetation  output  per 
hectare. 
The  conventional  approaches  to  rangeland  management  (equilibrium  systems  or  range 
succession  models)  use  livestock  numbers  as  a  tool  for  controlling  rangeland  degradation. 
Unlike  a  free-range  animal  grazing  system  typical  of  wildlife,  livestock  do  not  adjust  their 
densities in  relation  to grassland productivity. This is where the aggregate stocking rate needs 
to  be  checked  by  the  regulator,  vis-a-vis  the  current  carrying  capacity  of the  grazing  land. 
Nomadic  grazers  (wild  animals),  on  the  other hand,  would  move  seasonally  in  response  to 
grassland productivity, structure and species composition (McNaughton, 1985). 
Equation (A.2.5) states that the value of an  additional unit of vegetation, in situ, in period t (also 
called the user cost of vegetation) should equal the weighted marginal benefit to pastoralists in 
the  current period  measured by the change  in  the  net benefits from offtake and the future  net 
growth  in  the  stock  with  respect  to  the  change  in  vegetation.  When  vegetation  is  optimally 
managed,  the  marginal benefit from  standing vegetation  includes the  user cost of vegetation, 
g
Le., the value that an  unharvested unit would convey in the next period, petri [1 + a ], and the  av, 
impact that the  biomass of vegetation  will  have  on  water level  and  on  recharge  in  the  next 
.  d  [awl  ar] perlo  ,Plflt+1 -+- . av,  ax, 
Equation  (A2.6) states that when water is optimally managed, the value of an  additional unit of 
water in  situ,  either in  aquifers or in  rivers within the river basin will equal the weighted sum of 
benefits  from ,water  accruing  to  commercial  farmers,  smallholder  farmers,  households  and 
pastoralists,  plus  the  marginal benefit that a preserved  unit of  water will  convey  in  the  next 
period,  PIfI'+1 [1 + ar ], plus the change in water level with respect to net animal stock and net 
a~  , 
vegetal cover, respectively. 
The results  above  take  into account the  weights of benefits accruing  to  all  the  agents  in  the 
catchment and  also the extensiveness of actions of specific agents, particularly the pastoralists 
and  irrigators. The implication of the results is that land use options have direct impacts on  the 
time path of water in the river basin. It is a well established hypothesis that changes in  vegetal 
cover may have  marked effects on  catchment hydrology (O'Shaughnessy, et ai,  1983;  Smith, 
et  al;  1992). Changes in  vegetal  cover are  brought on  by the  grazing  patterns of pastoralists 
and  the  land  use  alternatives  available  to  smallholder  farmers  and  to  commercial  farmers. 
Both afforestation and land clearing could lead to either reduced or improved seasonal low flow 
depending  on  the  vegetal  species  involved.  The  latter  suggests  that  the  regulator  may  be 
advised to consider restricting species introduced in the catchment area, and also take steps to 
harmonize land use practices in her jurisdiction.
4 
4 For instance,  in mosquito-infested regions or where productive land is in short supply,  afforestation could 
be  used to speed up the process of transforming marshes and springs into inhabitable land.  According to 
Smith,  et aI,  1992,  eucalypts have the greatest impact on low flow  than pines because eucalypts show a 
faster growth rate in the first eight years after planting.  If  pines and eucalypts were planted in  areas where 
water is seasonally scarce, the impact could be disastrous for agents living downstream. 
8 
",-----" -,-''''-------­Conclusion 
The paper set out to model the allocation of water among competing users in  a river basin, and 
in  particular, attempted to answer the  question whether or not sustainable water resource use 
were possible under alternative property regimes. 
The results showed that under "open access" without an external regulator, agents are myopic 
and  would  only  be  concerned  with  maximizing  short  run  benefits  without  internalizing 
externalities imposed on  others, and  on  the ecosystem. As a consequence, water and  vegetal 
cover could  be  depleted  in  "open  access".  On  the  other hand,  a "cooperative"  management 
regime  with  a decentralized  regulator would  be  concerned  with  the  feedback  impacts of the 
actions of the agents on  each  other and on  the environment. By setting sustainability rules for 
both  water and  vegetation,  the  regulator maximizes long  run  benefits for all  the agents while 
internalizing  externalities  when,  and  as  they  occur.  A  "cooperative"  would  therefore  be 
concerned  with  sustaining  benefit  flows  to  the  community,  and  hence  maintenance  of  the 
resource base. 
Pastoralists would  be  expected  to  follow  restricted  grazing  practices  either through  seasonal 
moratoriums  on  grazing  or  adopting  fodder  and  stall-feeding  technologies.  Ecological 
considerations imply that species of the vegetation will regenerate during restriction. As more of 
these other sources of feed  become significant, other technologies such as stall-feeding could 
become viable options. This is not to  say that stall-feeding or these other technologies would 
replace the essential role  that rangelands play.  In  particular, the developed technologies would 
complement grazing lands, and more importantly arrest water and soil degradation. 
Alternatively, the grazing land condition can be modified continuously by adjusting stocking rate 
to  a  level  that  either  maximizes  long-term  production  per  area,  or  long-term  income,  or 
maintains  the  production  per  head  or  the  graze  land  condition  at  some  acceptable  level 
(Westoby,  e1.  al.,  1989).  Management  will  therefore  be  working  on  variables  that  are 
controllable, i.e., the stocking rate per household or village, or at any acceptable stratification of 
the  community.  If land  use  of the  rangelands  were  left unregulated,  the  intensity of soil  and 
water degradation could reach suicidal proportions.  . 
Pre-commitment  and  post-commitment  (financial  and  other  guarantees  entered  into  by 
individual  members  of the  community)  also  influence  the  effectiveness  of  institutions.  Pre­
commitment  refers  to  the  financial  and  other contributions  towards  the  management of the 
common property resource. The pre-commitment cost should not be such as to exclude others 
from  accessing  the  resource,  but  at  the  same  time  should  be  of  meaningful  value. 
Theoretically,  the  values  pre-committed  should  equal  the  marginal  benefits  accruing  to  the 
respective  participants. The post-commitment refers to the  system of punishment for violating 
use  restrictions.  The  idea  behind  post-commitment  guarantees  is  to  raise  the  cost  of 
environmental  shirking.  Post-commitment  works  if  the  regulating  institution  can  observe 
violators (monitor behavior) and apply penalties. 
Net irrigation could be used as a measure of water utilization by irrigated agricultural crops. The 
major focus  for the  regulator  would  be  minimizing  inefficiencies  in  distribution  of water,  and 
ensuring  that  irrigators  only  pump  adequate  water  necessary  to  sustain  a  standing  crop. 
Inefficient water use indicators include the volume of return flow and runoff, as a percentage of 
overall  pumping  capacity.  Water consumption  by  irrigators  also  depends  on  the  technology 
adopted.  For instance, overhead sprinkler irrigation systems are inefficient compared with drip 
systems. The regulator should therefore either impose penalties on  inefficient technologies or 
recommend water saving technologies to be adopted by the irrigators. 
When  all  agents  face  some  ecological  restrictions  on  the  use  of water and  complementary 
resources,  sustainability  could  be  achieved  without  reducing  the  flow  of  private  and  social 
9 benefits to all  resource users. Community cooperation in managing natural resources including 
water and  vegetal  resources depends crucially on  the nature  of commitments expected  from 
participating  agents.  An  agent's  commitment  in  turn  depends  on  the  benefits  from  resource 
using activities the agent engages in. 
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Static optimization in laissez-faire 
Commercial farmers 
Unconstrained optimization of the profit function (equation 1 in the text) 
17;(L,K,S,W) == P(q)q ­ C;(L,K,S,W) 
The first order necessary conditions: 
a'l 
aL 
P(t)  - e'(L) =0 
aL 
... (A1.1) 
a77  = pet) aq
aK  aK 
e'(K) = 0  ... (A1.2) 
a17  ==  pet)  - e'(S)  == 0  as  as 
... (A1.3) 
aw - pet) :~  e'(W) =0  ... (A1.4) 
Smallholder farmers! households 
Utility maximizing conditions are given by the first order conditions: 
au  (M),.-l ==  I  I  '  ... (A1.5)  aJ  0  I 
au  ... (A1.6) 
aT 
au  W's-I -=ll  ... (A1.7)  aw  45 
11 
The marginal rates of substitution are: 
au/aT  -l2l3 (Z),,-I 




l4lSW,,-1  ... (A1.9) 
au/a! 
... (A1.10)  au/w 
Pastora lists 
The objective function for the pastoralists is 
Maximize NP  B  ph - c(x, v, w) 
aNPB  ==  p ah _ ac(.) =0 
ax  ax  ... (A  1.11)  ax 
8NPB  8h ax  8cQ  == 0 

-;;;;-=p ai av  av  ... (A1.12) 

aNPB  all  ax  ac(.)
- ..--= p---- ..- 0 
... (A1.13)  aw  8x aw  aw 
12 APPENDIX 2 

The cooperative model is specified as follows. 

'" 
L  Lpt  {GV(.) +PA'+1 [Xt + f(x!, Vt' W,)- ht -X'+l]+ pet+ 1[Vt +g(X"  v"  WJ  V1+1 ]+ 
,=0 





Ov,  og]  [or  ]}  t P  1+1 -+- +PVlt+1  1+- -P Vlt  0  ... (A2.3)
Ow,  ow,  ow, 
13 From (A2.1): 
... (A2.4) 
From (A2.2): 
... (A2.5) 
From (A2.3): 
... (A2.6) 
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